CRAYTON AND JUNN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 1:19 PM

FIVE JUSTICES, SECTION 4, AND
THREE WAYS FORWARD IN
VOTING RIGHTS
KAREEM CRAYTON∗ & JANE JUNN∗∗
INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a critical examination of the genesis, content,
and possible consequences of the voting rights decision in Shelby
1
County v. Holder. This recent United States Supreme Court case,
among the most provocative of the Roberts Court era, fits within a
series of cases establishing a particularly radical judicial philosophy
about democratic participation. Though the majority purports only to
offer a technical and limited treatment of the Voting Rights Act’s
administrative remedy, which targets certain states and jurisdictions in
the country with a lengthy record of Fifteenth Amendment violations,
the decision is one of several demonstrating the Court’s skepticism
about federal safeguards for racial minorities’ role in political
discourse. This skepticism is reflected most acutely in the Shelby
County majority’s inattention to current evidence of racial
discrimination, which is at the core of the Court’s issue about the
2
statute.
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1. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2. Id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Without even identifying a standard of review,
the Court dismissively brushes off arguments based on ‘data from the record,’ and declines to
enter the ‘debat[e] [about] what [the] record shows.’ One would expect more from an opinion
striking at the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights legislation.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
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Assessing the constitutionality of a federal civil rights law, a
certain Justice of the Supreme Court wrote about Black citizens, “by
the aid of beneficent legislation, . . . there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen and
3
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws.” Echoes of this viewpoint
rang rather loudly in oral argument for Shelby County when Justice
Antonin Scalia attributed Congress’s nearly unanimous vote in 2006
to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act to “a phenomenon that is called
the perpetuation of racial entitlement,” adding rather sardonically,
4
“it’s been written about.”
Justice Scalia was surely correct about one thing. The so-called
phenomenon of racial entitlement has indeed been written about, and
5
the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 are but one example. There, Justice
Bradley invoked the phrase “special favorite of the laws” to admonish
Congress that laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1875—designed to
safeguard equal protection regardless of race—not only exceed
6
Congress’s power but also impede the political progress of freedmen.
Bradley’s prediction was that Black citizens would fare quite fine in
the former Confederate States, where slavery had been authorized by
7
law and custom, even in the absence of protective federal legislation.
The subsequent experience of African Americans demonstrates
the epic flaw of that ill-considered prediction. In the absence of
sustained federal oversight, state-sponsored race discrimination in
politics soon emerged. Despite the enactment of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, the systematic exclusion of non-Whites from
politics—through state constitutions, statutes, intimidation, and
violence—became the governing principle in these states for nearly
one hundred years, until the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. Under the Act, the federal government had oversight over
certain covered jurisdictions such that any changes these jurisdictions
proposed related to voting had to be preapproved before they could
3. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). We employ the terms ‘Black’ and ‘African
American’ interchangeably in this Article.
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96).
5. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (“When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the
aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
must be some stage . . . when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special
favorite of the laws . . . .”).
6. Id.
7. Id. (“There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition
of slavery . . . ; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of their personal status
as freemen because they were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”).
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8

go into effect, among other things.
Decades later, in 2006, and by an overwhelming margin, a
Republican-controlled Congress voted to continue the work
9
commenced in 1965 and extend the Act. The accompanying
legislative report noted that the legacies and practices from this sad
10
era of political exclusion had not yet been eradicated in these states.
Although registration and voting rates for non-White groups had
improved in covered jurisdictions, patterns of racial prejudice and
racially polarized voting, and the adoption of voter qualification laws
11
remained more pronounced. Taken as whole, this record persuaded
8. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King, Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). In light of the empirical record on racial disparities
in covered jurisdictions available to the Shelby County Court, the language of “racial
entitlement” is even more inapt than in the Civil Rights Cases. The racial entitlement arguments
were articulated more than a century ago without the aid of either systematic data or the
experience of the history of racial retrenchment in former slave-holding states. Both
demonstrate today that arguments about racial entitlement for Blacks have proved to be
fundamentally wrong, for it was the Court’s decision in 1883 that helped open the floodgates for
widespread state-sponsored institutionalized voting discrimination, and not the intervention of
Congress. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (“[N]o countenance of authority for the passage
of the [Civil Rights Act] in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its passage being
suggested, it must necessarily be declared void . . . .”).
9. This Article will discuss three sections of the Voting Rights Act in particular—Sections
2, 4, and 5. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (a permanent, nationwide provision) follows the
traditional litigation-oriented remedy contained in other civil rights bills. Section 2 entitles a
private citizen or the Department of Justice to seek a court-ordered remedy against a state or
local jurisdiction that enacts a policy or practice whose purpose or effect denies or abridges the
right to vote with respect to race. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2013). The second, more
controversial enforcement tool (the administrative remedy at issue in Shelby County) is Section
5—also called the preclearance remedy. For designated areas (as defined by the targeting
formula outlined in Section 4 of the Act), any proposed changes that relate to voting must be
reviewed or “precleared” before they can go into effect. Id. § 1973c. The federal reviewing
authority must find that the proposed change has neither the purpose nor the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote with respect to “race or color.” Id. § 1973c(a). The targeting
formula that designates the states where Section 5 applies is outlined in Section 4. Id. § 1973b.
States and jurisdictions in which less than half the eligible citizens were registered or
participated in specified elections (initially, 1964) and that also applied certain qualification
devices were included as “covered states.” See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 316–
20 (1966). See generally Kareem Crayton, Introduction to the Reports: Assessing Progress of the
Voting Rights Act, 17 USC REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 65 (2008) (reviewing the evolution of the
current provisions of the Voting Rights Act).
10. See 152 CONG. REC. S8372–73 (daily ed. July 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(“Leading up to the final passage of the Voting Rights Act reauthorization, I provided the
Senate with some of the extensive evidence received in the Judiciary Committee about the
persistence of discriminatory practices in covered jurisdictions that supports reauthorization of
this crucial provision.”).
11. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 11–12 (2006) (detailing evidence that demonstrates persistent
discrimination in covered jurisdictions).
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both Houses of Congress (by lopsided margins) that the risk was too
great and the burden too high on non-White voters to end the special
12
federal oversight of these states.
Only seven years later, in declaring parts of the Act
unconstitutional, the Shelby County Court endorsed the view that
race discrimination in covered jurisdictions is no longer a serious
13
concern that merits special attention. But the evidence collected by
Congress demonstrates a different position, that the problem remains
14
a present danger that requires sustained federal vigilance. Whether
race discrimination remains a present danger is at bottom a predictive
judgment about society, which is precisely why the Justices should
have relied upon the institution designed to make such an
15
assessment. This Article is an effort to expound upon the record
evidence that the Court seems to have disregarded.
Part I of this Article examines the different substantive areas that
undergird what we would define as the Roberts Court’s emerging
philosophy on political participation. The Court’s record has been
marked by a five-member majority that now drives these decisions.
Part II provides a close analysis of the current social science evidence
presented to the Court in Shelby County, in response to the Court’s
query whether Section 4’s formula identifying covered jurisdictions
was still relevant decades after the law was adopted. We show that the
five members of the Roberts majority failed to account for the distinct
political conditions present in these areas where preclearance applies
compared to those where the remedial provision does not. Part III
considers the various responsive steps that Congress might adopt in
the wake of Shelby County; the motivation for each of these options
rests upon how modestly one views the Court’s decision. We provide
our own recommendation of and defense for what we see as the best

12. The Act passed the House by a recorded vote of 390 to 33, 152 CONG. REC. H5207
(daily ed. July 13, 2006), and passed the Senate without amendment by Yea-Nay vote of 98 to 0,
152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006).
13. Throughout this Article we use the phrases “covered jurisdictions” and “covered
states” to refer to the subgroup of state and local governments that were designated for the
special administrative review process outlined under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Although the status of these states has changed considerably in the wake of Shelby County, for
simplicity and because it is unnecessary for the purposes of this Article, we do not distinguish
between covered and formerly covered jurisdictions.
14. See S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 14–15 (2006).
15. But see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (“Outside the strictures of
the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and
pursuing legislative objectives.”).
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route, namely reinforcing Section 5.
I. FIVE JUSTICES & SHELBY COUNTY
Contrary to those who would characterize Shelby County as a
modest statement about the scope of legislative authority, the case is
16
part of a pattern of radical decisions penned by the Roberts majority.
In fact, we argue that the five members of the Roberts majority have
left few doubts about the broad strokes of their viewpoint on the issue
of democratic participation in general, and on the topic of minority
voting rights in particular. Their decisions define a fairly clear agenda
that does not offer especially happy news for advocates in the civil
rights community.
Although some had hoped that the Chief Justice would pursue a
similarly conservative but pragmatic approach to these issues as his
predecessor William Rehnquist, instead the Roberts majority has
17
reopened debates previously considered long settled. Particularly in
cases that implicate important issues of political participation, the
Roberts majority has reached decisions and provided reasoning that
reveal a certain coldness—even hostility—toward existing structures
designed to assure open and equal involvement for historically
18
marginalized groups in elections and governance.
A basic review of some of the Court’s most significant cases
during the Roberts era highlights this point. Below, we compare the
Roberts Court’s behavior with its predecessor (the Rehnquist Court)
in three important areas of the law: (1) affirmative action, (2)
campaign finance, and (3) voting rights. Using representative

16. When we refer to the Roberts majority, we reference the emerging voting alliance that
comprises the Chief Justice and Associate Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. These
Justices have consistently formed the majority on the Court’s more controversial decisions
implicating issues of democratic participation. See, e.g., id. at 2618; Bartlett v. Strickland, 556
U.S. 1, 17, 25–26 (2009) (imposing a narrow interpretation of prima facie evidence of vote
dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709 (2007).
17. See discussion infra Parts I.A–I.C.
18. See generally Shelby Cnty, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (holding Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights
Act unconstitutional and effectively striking down the Section 5 preclearance provision); Nw.
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (holding that the
Voting Rights Act permits all political subdivisions to seek bailout from the preclearance
requirements of Section 5); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (finding
constitutional a state law requiring voter identification before casting a ballot); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (holding that a Texas district
was drawn unconstitutionally but noting skepticism about the legitimacy of using race in the
districting process).
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decisions from each area of law, we demonstrate how Roberts has
departed from the Rehnquist era doctrine in order to reopen
19
previously settled matters in constitutional law. The new doctrinal
terrain may prove perilous for non-White citizens, as they assume new
burdens in light of the Court’s dismantling of existing structural
protections.
A. Affirmative Action
The Chief Justice has rather consistently voted along with a
20
majority to undo several policies related to affirmative action.
Whereas the Rehnquist era majority at times voiced unease with race21
conscious remedies, the Roberts majority has expressed very little
hesitation when dismantling state-based programs that help offset
disparate life chances for racial groups. Prior to Roberts’s
confirmation, the Court followed Justice O’Connor’s suggested
approach of weighing the particular facts and circumstances, and
assessing the institutional justification behind a given affirmative
22
23
action policy. For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court upheld
the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan on
the ground that maintaining a diverse law school class promoted a
24
key social good. Though race-conscious remedies were disfavored
even then, a state was able to adopt policies to assure that fellow

19. Although Ricci v. DeStefano, discussed below, is explicitly a case involving Title VII,
the decision relies on the Court’s understanding of the defendant city’s obligations to prevent
racial discrimination in its employment qualification exams, which in turn implicates the
Fourteenth Amendment color-blindness norms that form the basis of the plaintiff class in this
case.
20. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 705 (striking down voluntary
school desegregation and integration efforts as not sufficiently “narrowly tailored”).
21. See generally Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495 (2000); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
22. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288–90 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“The imposition of a requirement that public employers make findings that they
have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs would
severely undermine public employers’ incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights
obligations.”); id. at 292 (“[I]n order to provide some measure of protection to the interests of
its nonminority employees and the employer itself in the event that its affirmative action plan is
challenged, the public employer must have a firm basis for determining that affirmative action is
warranted.”).
23. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
24. Id. at 308. But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273–75 (2003) (holding that the
affirmative action program for the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions was
unconstitutional because the University automatically awarded points necessary for admission
to minority applicants).
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students and the broader public enjoyed the benefits of a community
of legal professionals who represented and were familiar with all
25
segments of society. Using the Michigan model, schools could pursue
the goal of maintaining a critical mass of non-White students in order
26
to achieve a diverse and successful intellectual community.
The Roberts Court thus far has shown far less deference to state
27
actors who decide to pursue such concerns. In place of the Rehnquist
era deference to educational institutions that choose to pursue
affirmative action programs, the Roberts Court has erected a
generally unforgiving prohibition on race-conscious decision-making
such that few if any such programs will survive scrutiny—even where
the stated goal is diversity.
The Roberts majority’s approach was presented most clearly in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
28
1, where a local school district sought to maintain student
populations that were balanced based on race and other factors
29
through a race-conscious student assignment plan. Although the
school’s assignment plan was to be entirely voluntary, the Court
voided this approach because of its attention to a classification that it
30
viewed as arbitrary. Harkening back to the traditional discrimination
cases that invoked strict scrutiny for all such classifications—
pernicious or benign—the Court articulated its guiding principle:
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
31
discriminating on the basis of race.” The school district’s concerns
about diversity were not sufficient to create a meaningful exception to
this seemingly bright line rule. The Court held that absent a pattern of
racial exclusion, the local government could not justify implementing
32
programs to enhance diversity in public schools. In so finding, the
Court effectively eviscerated a program with a structure and goal that
25. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29 (“The Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”).
26. Id. at 329–30 (“As part of its goal of ‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally
academically qualified and broadly diverse,’ the Law School seeks to ‘enroll a “critical mass” of
minority students.’” (citation omitted)).
27. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013) (suggesting
that under strict scrutiny review, universities are entitled to some but not total deference with
respect to their decision to employ affirmative action programs, and no deference with respect
to the question of narrow tailoring).
28. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
29. Id. at 711–12.
30. Id. at 703–04.
31. Id. at 747–48.
32. Id. at 702–03.
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mirrored the approach to affirmative action that had been embraced
during the Rehnquist era.
The Roberts majority has applied its new approach beyond the
33
educational sphere. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court roundly
criticized an employment-related affirmative action plan because the
plan interfered with what the Court viewed as the normal course of
34
local governance. There, a city government vacated the results of an
employment-qualifying exam for firefighters, in part due to concern
35
that the city might be subject to a discrimination lawsuit. Although
the employer took subsequent preventative action to ensure that its
exam was free from racially disparate effects, the Court ordered the
original exam results reinstated, effectively voiding the impact of the
36
city’s race-conscious reforms.
One operative feature of the Ricci decision was the assessment of
the process that gave rise to the city’s preemptive action. The holding
seemingly rests on the assumption that the normal order of public
governance would never have mandated the invalidation of an exam
37
that had already been administered. This analysis leaves out any
valid consideration of the exam’s ability to measure qualifications
38
accurately or to prevent unlawful racially disparate effects. In
addition, some of the Justices took note of the involvement of special
interest groups, including a local minister who called public attention
39
to the racial impact of the exam. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Alito expounded on his unease with the close relationship between

33. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
34. Id. at 562–63.
35. Id. at 562.
36. Id. at 593 (“[T]he City was required to make a difficult inquiry [regarding the prospect
of disparate-impact liability]. But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparateimpact violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the racial
disparity in the results.”).
37. See id. at 585 (noting that employers are entitled to employ “affirmative efforts to
ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the
process by which promotions will be made,” but that once established, employers “may not then
invalidate the test results”).
38. See id. at 587, 592 (finding it sufficient that “the examinations were job related and
consistent with business necessity,” and refuting the argument that the examination may have
produced discriminatory results); Cheryl Harris & Kimberley West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci:
Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 83 (2010).
39. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 600–01 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Civil Service Board [or CSB] . .
. convened its first public meeting. Almost immediately, Rev. Kimber began to exert political
pressure on the CSB. . . . Reverend Kimber protested the public meeting, arguing that he and
the other fire commissioners should first be allowed to meet with the CSB in private.” (citations
omitted)).
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New Haven’s mayor and an African American minister, Reverend
40
Kimber, who was a “self-professed kingmaker.” The city’s
acquiescence to the minister’s pressure to eliminate the exam
apparently indicated a kind of dysfunction of the political process,
because the outcome was likely affected by some external (and
undue) leverage.
The holding suggests that, from the viewpoint of the Roberts
majority, the (presumably unfounded) threat of a discrimination
41
lawsuit led the city to acquiesce —which represented an abdication
of the city’s duty to respond to the broader public. Put differently, the
Court suspected that the political decision to suspend the exams was
flawed because an entrenched minority demanded the adoption of a
policy that ran counter to the interests of a majority of citizens.
However, this rent-seeking outcome commonly occurs in politics
when a small group with especially high stakes in a policy
concentrates its effort on lobbying government for policy
concessions—including ones that do not align with majority
preferences. The reasoning of the case suggests that minority groups
could not have obtained a policy to benefit non-Whites without undue
42
influence. The effectiveness of minority groups was presumed not
the result of traditional democratic bargaining but of unfair
leveraging that harmed at least the plaintiff class in Ricci and perhaps
the larger community.
B. Campaign Finance
The second area of constitutional doctrine that is now in play
under the Roberts Court is campaign finance. Few people would
characterize earlier eras of the Court as rampant with decisions
encouraging robust federal regulation. It has long been established,
however, that there is a clear legal distinction between enforcing
limits on campaign spending (which remained relatively unregulated)
and limits on fundraising (which, based upon concerns about

40. Id. at 598 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See id. at 592 (majority opinion) (“[T]here is no genuine dispute that the City lacked a
strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the
examination results.”).
42. See id. at 598–99 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he District Court admitted that ‘a jury
could rationally infer that city officials worked behind the scenes to sabotage the promotional
examinations because they knew that, were the exams certified, the Mayor would incur the
wrath of [Rev. Boise] Kimber and other influential leaders of New Haven's African-American
community.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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transparency and corruption, were subject to strict constraints). Not
only has the Roberts majority effectively eviscerated these
44
distinctions, it has now introduced the wildcard of corporate
45
personhood into the conversation.
46
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Roberts
47
majority voided key provisions of the McCain-Feingold Act, at least
one of which had been upheld during the Rehnquist era in McConnell
48
v. Federal Election Commission. The decision in Citizens United
stands for the proposition that corporations and unions exercise
speech rights comparable to those of a natural person under the First
49
Amendment. Accordingly, the government may not limit the
expenditure of union or corporate general funds when they are used
to support independent election-related activity like campaign
50
commercials.
Unlike the direct support of a campaign or candidate, the Court
reasoned, independent expenditures do not create the same risks of
51
political corruption that justify regulation. So long as the group in
question does not coordinate directly with a candidate’s campaign, its

43. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (upholding the Federal Election
Campaign Act’s individual contribution limits, but invalidating the Act’s limitations on
campaign expenditures). See generally Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1469 (2001) (questioning whether campaign finance reform can be inclusive of multi-racial
interests).
44. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (“The Government may
regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may
not suppress that speech altogether.”).
45. See id. at 343 (“[P]olitical speech of corporations or other associations should [not] be
treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural
persons.’”).
46. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
47. Id. at 365 (“[O]verruling Austin ‘effectively invalidate[s] not only [the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act] Section 203, but also 2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition on the use of corporate
treasury funds for express advocacy.’ Section 441b's restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures are therefore invalid . . . .” (citation omitted)).
48. See 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, relating to soft-money contributions and certain electioneering communications).
49. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313 (“Bellotti reaffirmed the First Amendment principle
that the Government lacks the power to restrict political speech based on the speaker's
corporate identity.” (citing First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978))).
50. Id. at 353 (holding that “[t]here is simply no support for the view that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by
media corporations”).
51. Id. at 314 (“[T]his Court now concludes that independent expenditures, including
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.
That speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those
officials are corrupt.”).
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financial backing of an independent viewpoint in the political
52
discourse must not be limited. Indeed, the Court even appeared to
endorse the suggestion that more speech of this kind actually
improved, not distorted, the public’s deliberative process—providing
53
further support for its surprising and sweeping decision.
The holding in Citizens United is closely tied to a view the Roberts
majority has about the proper functioning of the democratic process.
The Roberts majority embraces the Rehnquist era notion that money
is a form of protected political speech. However, Roberts goes much
further in advancing the proposition that corporate speech is
54
equivalent in value and impact to individual speech. Thus, the
Roberts majority appears less concerned with the dangers of
unbridled spending on political messaging and voters’ ability to
discern how their preferences align with the groups behind the
messages.
The point is not just one of abstract curiosity. It also carries major
consequences for political outcomes. Principally, the decision led to
55
the proliferation of Super PACs. The Super PAC often serves as a
shell for corporations and political parties, permitting these groups to
funnel unregulated money from anonymous donors in amounts that
56
go as deep as personal bank accounts will permit. So long as Super
PACs can justify their classification as “social welfare groups,” there is
52. See id. at 360 (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the
electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.” (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976))).
53. See id. at 312 (“The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law
it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political
speech context, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”).
54. See id. at 365 (“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity.
No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or forprofit corporations.”); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, THE NEW YORKER (May 21,
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/21/120521fa_fact_toobin?currentPage=all
(emphasizing that the Court could have decided the case on much narrower grounds, and that
the broad holding ultimately reached “reflects the aggressive conservative judicial activism of
the Roberts Court”).
55. Richard L. Hasen, Super-Soft Money: How Justice Kennedy Paved the Way for
‘SuperPACS’ and the Return of Soft Money, SLATE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/10/citizens_united_how_justice_kennedy_has_pav
ed_the_way_for_the_re.html.
56. See Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644–45 (2012) (“Super
PACs spent an estimated $65 million on independent expenditures in 2010 . . . . By early 2012,
Super PACs were already major participants in the 2011-2012 election cycle, significantly
outspending the candidates in the early Republican presidential nominating contests.”).
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no requirement to report funding sources or membership, obscuring
57
the sponsors of attack ads. The effect on the political process is a
deluge of heavily funded messages unattributed to groups or to
specific individuals. This information distortion often prevents
individuals from understanding how major political interests align on
58
a given issue.
The stakes are likely more pronounced when one takes account of
race, because the issues of who gives and how much tend to be driven
to a significant degree by one’s racial background. As Professor Terry
Smith has persuasively noted, political communities with heavy
concentrations of racial minorities tend to feature low levels of
59
individual political giving. Where this is true, candidates and
campaigns are often more dependent on corporate infusions of cash
or, alternatively, more vulnerable to a well-funded challenger.
To the extent that Citizens United permits more funding of
unattributed political messages, in these communities candidates are
more likely to be swayed by external, concentrated interests that may
undermine the interests of their constituencies. As Black candidates
60
are rarely self-funders, their need to pursue non-coordinated Super
PAC dollars adds more pressure on voters in these areas to ensure
that their collective policy interests retain priority over (now
anonymous) corporate concerns.
C. Voting Rights
Finally, the area with the most direct linkage to the issue at hand is
voting rights. Here as well, the Roberts majority has sharply departed
from the Rehnquist era cases that addressed the 1965 Voting Rights
Act—especially with respect to the now-inert preclearance provision.
57. Kathy Kiely & Jacob Fenton, Outside Political Spending Crosses $1 Billion Mark,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/
2012/outside-political-spending-crosses-1-billion-mark/ (“Outside groups' $1 billion has funded
an overwhelmingly negative shadow campaign: More than 80 percent of the spending has gone
to oppose, rather than support, candidates. And it includes $219 million in dark money—
donations from nonprofit organizations which, because of their tax-exempt status, will never
have to disclose their donors.”); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-(1) (2013).
58. BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM LIOZ, DEMOS & U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, MILLIONDOLLAR MEGAPHONES: SUPER PACS AND UNLIMITED OUTSIDE SPENDING IN THE 2012
ELECTIONS 6 (2012), available at http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/
MegaphonesMillionaires-DemosUSPIRG.pdf; see also Brian Montopoli, Colbert Super PAC Ad
Promises “Orgy of Pure Distortion”, CBS NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-503544_162-57361118-503544/colbert-super-pac-ad-promises-orgy-of-pure-distortion/.
59. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 43, at 1499–1500, 1512–15.
60. Id.
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The Roberts majority has reopened questions thought long settled
about the legitimacy of the Act and introduced novel questions that
leave observers mystified about how far the current Court intends to
move the doctrine.
To be sure, there were some reasons for concern about the vitality
of the preclearance regime even during the Rehnquist era. Starting
61
with City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court indicated its desire to more
carefully review federal anti-discrimination laws to assure that they
62
were within the scope of legislative enforcement authority. In City of
Boerne, the Court devised a test that turned on evidence of
congruence and proportionality between observed constitutional
63
injuries and the remedy contemplated in the statutory scheme.
Though several enactments were voided for lack of constitutional
64
fit during the Rehnquist era, advocates retained guarded optimism
about the constitutionality of Section 5, the administrative remedy in
65
the Voting Rights Act, for two reasons. First, the Court had
repeatedly cited Section 5 as a model of a federal law whose limits
and evidentiary foundation complied with the rubric set forth in City
66
of Boerne. Although several commentators have opined that these
citations only referred to the original 1965 enactment (and not the
67
later extensions), there was at least some foundation for the belief

61. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
62. Id. at 518 (“It is also true, however, that ‘[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement
power is, it is not unlimited.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
128 (1970))).
63. Id. at 530 (“While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures,
there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.”).
64. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (striking down
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to the states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91–92 (2000) (striking down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
as applied to the states).
65. Section 5, the administrative remedy in the Voting Rights Act, directs jurisdictions
specified by Section 4 to preclear “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2013). A
jurisdiction can seek review by the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. In either case, the jurisdiction needs to
show that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Id.
66. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (“Here, as in Katzenbach . . .
Congress again confronted a difficult and intractable proble[m] . . . where previous legislative
attempts had failed.” (citations omitted)).
67. See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights
Act: How Much Discrimination can the Constitution Tolerate, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385,
387 (2008); Richard Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 196 (2005).
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68

that a challenge to Section 5 would not succeed.
A second reason for a patina of hope was rooted in the Court’s
reasoning as it worked through the doctrinal line of cases following
City of Boerne. In approving federal legislation in various cases, the
Court developed an analytical framework that seemed to offer a
69
70
favorable view of Section 5. For example, in Tennessee v. Lane, the
Court noted that Section 5 was a valid congressional enactment
insofar as it responded to a clear pattern of state discrimination in a
71
congruent and proportional way. Even in dissent, Justice Scalia
synthesized the earlier cases in a way that established a kind of
“sliding scale” approach to scrutiny depending on the type of
72
legislation under review. For laws addressing fundamental rights (as
73
in Lane) or suspect classifications (as in Nevada v. Hibbs ), the Court
has been disposed to apply a more forgiving analysis with respect to
constitutional “fit” that does not as easily overturn a remedial
74
enactment. Insofar as Section 5 implicated the intersection of these
two factors—protecting the right to vote for racial minorities—any
subsequent challenge under this recitation of the City of Boerne
standard seemed unlikely to prevail. The optimism, in retrospect, was
clearly unwarranted.

68. This is principally because the Court had upheld the Act against several past
challenges. See, for example, City of Rome v. United States, where the Court approved a 1982
congressional extension of Section 5 against an attack by Georgia officials, who suggested that
federal oversight was no longer necessary. 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980).
69. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (noting that congressional power
is heightened when Congress enacts remedial legislation that addresses problems at the
convergence of race and fundamental rights); see also Hasen, supra note 67, at 181–82
(discussing decisions by the Court to uphold federal legislation).
70. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
71. Id. at 532–33.
72. See id. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying the “permissive McCulloch standard to
congressional measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by the States,” and noting that
“Congress may impose prophylactic § 5 legislation only upon those particular States in which
there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations,” and that the
prophylactic remedy “must be directed against the States or state actors rather than the public
at large”).
73. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
74. See id. at 539 (discussing how the City of Boerne analysis applies to remedies for state
violations of fundamental rights like due process); see also Pamela Karlan, Section 5 Squared:
Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007)
(observing that when “Congress acts to protect a fundamental right or when it acts to protect a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, its powers are generally broader than when it acts to promote
equality more generally”).
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In the Roberts Court’s first major Section 5 case, Northwest Austin
75
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUNDO), the
complaining jurisdiction argued that its inability to bail out of the
76
preclearance process was a fatal constitutional flaw in the provision.
Taking the Rehnquist era doctrine on its face, the local jurisdiction
could not have independently exited the preclearance system because
77
it was situated within a wholly covered state. In an earlier case, City
78
of Rome v. United States, the Court made this point clear based on a
79
straightforward application of interpretive principles. The statutory
text simply did not lend itself to such a reading, and the legislative
record included analogous situations that Congress clearly intended
80
to prohibit when it designed the law’s administrative remedy.
Yet, NAMUNDO departs from this view notwithstanding
expressed concerns in City of Rome and related voting rights cases
that manipulation of state election administration power vis-à-vis
81
local authorities would go undetected, along with historical
82
experience that suggested the same. The NAMUDNO Court noted
that the ruling served the interests of local policymaking bodies that
needed to perform basic functions without the overwhelming burdens
83
of federal oversight. Indeed, though Roberts declined to address the
constitutional question about Section 5, he noted that the issue raised
75. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
76. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 12, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (No. 08-32) (“The district
court’s interpretation makes bailout a virtual nullity in all but a very few covered jurisdictions,
apparently all in Virginia. Moreover, that interpretation reorders state government by putting
counties in control of entities not subject to their authority under state law.”).
77. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 209.
78. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
79. Id. at 173 (“[A]ppellants urge that . . . § 5, to the extent that it prohibits voting changes
that have only a discriminatory effect, is unconstitutional. Because the statutory meaning and
congressional intent are plain, however, we . . . reject the appellants' suggestion that we engage
in a saving construction and avoid the constitutional issues they raise.”).
80. Id. at 178–80.
81. Compare NAMUNDO, 446 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“More than 40 years after its enactment, this intrusion has become increasingly difficult
to justify.”), with United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 111 (1978)
(“[Excluding localities from preclearance obligations] permits precisely the kind of
circumvention of congressional policy that § 5 was designed to prevent.”).
82. Indeed, the tactic of devolving authority from the state level to the local level to evade
federal constitutional demands was one of the very experiences that Congress addressed in
devising the Voting Rights Act in 1965. See Reynolds v. Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593, 594 (S.D.
Ala. 1965).
83. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202 (“At the same time, § 5, which authorizes federal
intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial federalism
costs.” (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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concerns that the Court would likely consider at some point in the
84
near future. From Roberts’s perspective, the remedial provision did
not make clear why some of the covered jurisdictions continued to
85
merit special treatment and others did not. Once the issue was
squarely presented, the Court was likely to demand clear justification
for the disparate treatment, especially due to the severe interference
86
with the “sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.”
The underlying message about democratic participation had all
the subtlety of a crashing cymbal: Local governments could properly
handle the business of the people without an artificial process
centered on racial considerations. And given that the available record
evidence left the Roberts majority unpersuaded about whether
covered states were distinct from non-covered states, there is little
wonder that the concerns animating City of Rome carried little
87
weight. For the Roberts majority, the racial fairness agenda has
resolutely and completely lost its priority in favor of local political
governance concerns.
II. WHAT THE COURT IN REVIEWING SECTION 4 REFUSED TO
ACKNOWLEDGE ABOUT CONTINUING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
This Part turns to the decision and reasoning in Shelby County
itself, focusing on the material presented to the Court. Specifically,
this Part reviews the abundant social science data showing the current
distinctions in covered jurisdictions that helped to animate Congress’s
action to renew the statutory remedy in 2006. In light of the readily
available record evidence that shows empirically verifiable
differences between covered states and the rest of the country, the
Court’s claim that it found no rational connection between current
conditions and the remedy contained in Section 5 is subject to
considerable doubt.

84. Id. at 211 (noting that “[i]n part due to the success of [the Voting Rights Act], we are
now a very different Nation,” but that “[w]hether conditions continue to justify such legislation
is a difficult constitutional question we do not answer today”).
85. Id. at 203–04.
86. Id. at 202 (noting that members of the Court have previously expressed misgivings
about the constitutionality of Section 5 due to the provision’s “federalism costs”).
87. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167 (1980) (noting that “the coverage
formula of § 4(b) has never been applied” to the defendant city, but that the city nonetheless
“comes within the Act because it is part of a covered State”).
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The pernicious history that gave rise to Congress’s initial
enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 was deep and prolonged
enough to merit a long-term federal response. Further, the
contemporary record presented to the Court demonstrates that this
legacy is not very easily forgotten. The most recalcitrant states
identified in 1965 remain works in progress.
A. The Voting Rights Act Did Not Respond to a Short-Term Problem
No party in Shelby County disputed the fact that Congress’s
intervention in 1965 to rid the country of race discrimination in the
political arena was warranted. Though Shelby County asserted that
the time had arrived for this project to end, the basis on which it
framed the argument was both incomplete and contrary to
contemporary empirical evidence documenting the persistence of
88
racial disparity in covered jurisdictions.
The Shelby County Court mistook the goal of removing the legal
barriers to non-White citizens registering to vote as a limited and
89
short-term effort. This perspective ignored the fact that preventing
minority citizens from being excluded from voting in covered
jurisdictions was but one aspect of Congress’s broader effort to end
institutionalized political exclusion based on race. The racially
discriminatory practices embedded in institutions, political culture,
and popular attitudes that necessitated the Voting Rights Act were
nourished by the institution of slavery and have deep roots dating
back centuries. Thus, ensuring that minority citizens could get to the
ballot box was a necessary but not at all sufficient step to address the
problem.
We argue that institutionalized race discrimination was in fact the
evil that the statute addresses, which is a long-term project.
Institutionalized race discrimination was the effective political norm
in the South for nearly a century after the Reconstruction
Amendments. Under the system of Jim Crow, state government
institutions
prevented
non-Whites
from
exercising
their
constitutionally protected rights, which included, inter alia, casting
ballots, engaging in political activities like campaigning, and enjoying
responsive government representation.
88. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 28, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No.
12-96) (stating that “[n]othing in the record suggests that covered jurisdictions remain engaged
in the pervasive voting discrimination and electoral gamesmanship”).
89. Id. at 29.
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1. Institutionalized Discrimination in the South pre-1965
Congress has recognized on multiple occasions that dismantling
deeply entrenched racial discrimination in the political system
demands sustained vigilance. Otherwise, there could be no assurance
that states would not reverse course on the hard won protections that
90
took decades to establish. In this regard, it is worth highlighting the
obvious: This concern with the risk of state retrenchment is not just
one of abstract logic but of historical experience. The imperative of
protecting the equal right to vote regardless of race has only been
systematically enforced since the 1965 Act and South Carolina v.
91
Katzenbach, a mere half-century ago, compared with the practice of
explicit racial discrimination that occurred during the century prior.
Put differently, the current era is a fraction of the length of time that
the period of institutionalized political exclusion was the order of the
day in the American South.
We refer to institutionalized political exclusion as a system,
represented in the structures, practices, and norms of government
institutions, designed to deny or limit the political effectiveness of a
specific class of citizens. The concept reflects a fundamental
organization of private and public power to deny a targeted group an
equal share of the inputs and outputs of government. This political
model reflects a jointly held agreement by the larger electorate to
reject the excluded group’s status as equal citizens, which is a
principle born of personal or group animus. The realm of politics
therefore is set aside for the involvement and enjoyment of several
interests—but not those of the excluded group. The point of
describing the model as institutionalized is that this system is both
self-reinforcing (meaning that it is perpetual) and that it is resistant to
contrary external pressures.
In the post-Reconstruction American South, the exclusion of
Black voters illustrates this model quite well. Even though the

90. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5143 (2006) (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (“In fact, the extensive record of continued abuse compiled by the committee
over the last year, which I have put on the table here today, echoes that which preceded
congressional reauthorization of the [Voting Rights Act] in 1982.”). See also CHARLES S.
BULLOCK III & RONALD KEITH GADDIE, THE TRIUMPH OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH 8–
20 (2009) (describing the motivation and timing of congressional enactments aimed at providing
access to the ballot, beginning in 1957 with the Civil Rights Act—in addition to subsequent
versions of the Act passed in 1960 and 1964—and the 1965 Voting Rights Act and subsequent
reauthorizations in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006).
91. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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Constitution had been amended to establish and safeguard the equal
status of freedmen, the politics of the former Confederate States did
not long embrace this principle in practice. Indeed, these states soon
returned to their prior practice of marginalizing and subjugating
Blacks in both law and practice. Through both public and private
efforts, the noteworthy but brief period of Black political
participation, officeholding, and policymaking ended with a
multifaceted campaign to re-establish the norm that reduced Blacks
in these states to second-class citizenship. We expound below on the
components of institutionalized exclusion as they were manifested in
the post-Reconstruction South.
2. The Ideology of Racial Animus
At the core of the strategy for retrenchment was the ideology of
racism itself—the popular denial among Whites of the political and
even natural equality of Black persons. Linked to the bare racial
animus on which slavery itself was founded, the expressions of the
inherent inferiority of Blacks were framed as arguments that Blacks
were less educated, inclined toward corruption, and genetically
92
attuned toward savagery. This ideological frame was promulgated by
several political figures and animated campaigns throughout the
93
twentieth century. Aside from the personal benefit to the individual
politician, the argument called for political and social systems to
assure that the less civilized class of persons remained distanced from
the reins of government power. Accordingly, state legislatures
developed criminal laws intended to target Black citizens, adopted
qualification devices that privileged Whites, and condoned private
acts of violence that sought to enforce a norm of inferiority through
94
terror.
The ideology also focused on curtailing political activities that are
key precursors to political participation, such as the ability of citizens
to organize and to associate. Social science recognizes that one’s
92. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978) (cataloging the foundations
of racial ideologies in the early colonial period).
93. See V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS: IN STATE AND NATION 142–45, 241–46 (1949)
(recounting the racial campaigns employed by figures including Ben “Pitchfork” Tillman of
South Carolina and Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi).
94. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the
Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 31–37 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (reviewing
examples of efforts to limit political freedoms using qualification devices and criminal
provisions).
THE
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likelihood to register and vote partly depends upon one’s level of
95
involvement in civic life, including traditional political activities such
as attending rallies, signing petitions, and seeking redress of
96
grievances. The Supreme Court has recognized these core activities
97
as protected under the First Amendment.
In maintaining institutionalized political exclusion, preclearance
states were responsible for some of the most egregious restrictions on
these rights. The State of Alabama is a rather notorious example—it
adopted laws that required the publication of membership lists from
98
civil rights organizations. In addition, Alabama, among other states,
implicitly sanctioned violent criminal activity against certain
Americans exercising their rights of association by under-enforcing
99
the law in the face of blatantly discriminatory and unlawful behavior.
Not until decades after citizens were killed for engaging in activities
like registering voters did the government attempt to correct flawed
100
state court trials that previously failed to convict wrongdoers.
3. Vote Denial
To be sure, the most obvious feature of institutionalized racial
exclusion is denying minority citizens the opportunity to register and
vote. The ability to exercise the franchise itself represents an
important marker of equal status as citizens, and the long-time denial
of this right in certain states was a critical element of the asserted
theory of second-class citizenship. Put differently, disenfranchisement
95. See William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic
Education, 4 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 217, 224 (2001); James B. Hyman & Peter Levine, Civic
Engagement and the Disadvantaged: Challenges, Opportunities and Recommendations 1–7 (The
Ctr. for Info. & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, Working Paper No. 63, Dec. 2008),
available at http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/WorkingPapers/WP63_Hyman_Levine.pdf.
96. Sidney Verba et al., Race Ethnicity and Political Participation, in CLASSIFYING BY
RACE 354, 355 (Paul Peterson ed., 1995).
97. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 230–33, 238 (1963) (finding that
convictions of protesters at the state capitol violated the freedom to petition for redress of
grievances); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939) (reaffirming the
freedom to assemble peaceably); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (“The holding of
meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (holding that the right of peaceable assembly is an attribute of national
citizenship and is guaranteed by the United States).
98. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958) (discussing the State of Alabama’s
requirement that the NAACP produce membership lists).
99. See STEVEN A. LIGHT, THE LAW IS GOOD: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
REDISTRICTING, AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS 42–43 (2010).
100. Dan Barry et al., When Cold Cases Stay Cold, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/us/souths-cold-cases-reopened-but-still-unresolved.html?pa
gewanted=all&_r=0.
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was the linchpin in the plan to maintain an unconstitutional scheme of
discrimination in all facets of public and private life. From the end of
the Reconstruction era, the effort to undo the guarantees of the
Reconstruction Amendments targeted the franchise as a primary
101
means to control the political and social advancement of Blacks.
Curtailing the exercise of the franchise also reversed another clear
metric of progress—the election of Black political candidates for state
and federal offices.
Common efforts during the post-Reconstruction era included the
adoption of devices like the grandfather clause, poll taxes, and literacy
tests. In the long term, states attempted to cement these changes with
the ratification of new constitutions to prevent the realization of
political power among those previously excluded from voting on the
102
basis of race. And, as Morgan Kousser has amply demonstrated, the
use of private violence was a factor that worked in concert with the
more formalized practices of maintaining a stranglehold on the
103
exercise of Black political power.
Due to systematic disenfranchisement on the basis of race, the
most recalcitrant of segregationist politicians were able to represent
some of the largest concentrations of African Americans in the
104
South. These politicians had no reason to address or even
acknowledge the issues most relevant to non-Whites. Indeed, many of
the early efforts by Congress to pass civil rights legislation (including
voting rights bills) were thwarted by segregationist White members of
Congress who hailed from Southern districts in which large numbers
105
of African Americans were disenfranchised.
Although Black
101. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 135, 142–
50 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (discussing strategies employed by
states to undermine the effectiveness of the Fifteenth Amendment).
102. In 1960, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia enforced a poll tax, and
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia
employed a literacy test. See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and
White Voter Registration in the South, QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, 351, 374 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
103. See Kousser, supra note 101, at 141–42 (recalling instances of armed violence in
Louisiana and Mississippi).
104. See, e.g., George C. Wallace, Governor of the State of Alabama, Inaugural Address 2
(Jan. 14, 1963) (transcript available at http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/utils/getfile/collection/
voices/id/2952/filename/2953.pdf) (calling for “segregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . .
segregation forever”).
105. One of the most prominent examples of failed civil rights legislative efforts is the Dyer
Anti-Lynching Bill, which was repeatedly blocked in Congress due to the organized objections
of Southern Democrats. See 67 CONG. REC. H1779 (1922).
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representation in Congress and across other levels of government has
increased in the current era, it is noteworthy that a full measure of
representational equality remains elusive for minority Americans,
106
including African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans.
4. Denying Substantive Benefits
Finally, a significant feature closely related to the absence of
representational power where a group is institutionally excluded is
the lack of substantive responsiveness. There should be little surprise
that the product of the system is little to no improvement in the
material existence of non-White citizens in both real and relative
terms compared with White citizens. Without efforts in elected bodies
to advance the causes that are important to a given community, a
group has little chance at directing policy toward its material benefit.
The absence of any meaningful quantum of minority voter pressure in
the political arena had the consequence of severely limiting the
willingness of elected officials to focus on non-White citizens and
their material needs and interests.
The largely rural and agricultural based communities in the postReconstruction South were and remain among the poorest in the
107
nation. Among the starkest disparities was the funding of public
schools, where the policy of maintaining inequity between Black and
108
White schools was repeatedly invalidated by the federal courts. The
persistent racial disparities were only possible due to the commitment
of all-White legislatures to the cause of racial segregation and the
wholesale denial of voter registration to African Americans in the
South who otherwise would have challenged it.
106. RONALD SCHMIDT, SR. ET AL., NEWCOMERS, OUTSIDERS, AND INSIDERS:
IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN RACIAL POLITICS IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14
(2009).
107. Though all the residents in these areas suffered, African Americans continue to face
the greatest economic challenges and lowest standards of living. See Angel L. Harris, The
Economic and Educational State of Black Americans in the 21st Century: Should We be
Optimistic or Concerned?, 37 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 241, 245 (2010) (noting that, “[i]n
general, black Americans are disadvantage[d] across various measures of economic well-being”
with regard to unemployment rates, durations of unemployment, net worth, and education).
108. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1964) (finding that a local
school board decision to close public schools and provide vouchers to attend private schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01
(1955) (setting forth directions for implementing the Court’s earlier decision in Brown I);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring state laws establishing
separate but equal public schools for black and white students unconstitutional); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding public school segregation in the District of Columbia
unconstitutional).
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B. Contemporary Social Science Evidence
The historical circumstances described above that we link to
institutionalized racial exclusion did not disappear in 1965. They have
left a legacy that illustrates the ongoing need for the project that
Congress commenced when it adopted the Voting Rights Act. We next
discuss the significance of these disparate conditions, and the
remainder of this section details empirically quantifiable
contemporary indicators of racial exclusion and discrimination that
the Shelby County Court failed to consider in its majority opinion.
The analysis documents systematic variation between covered and
non-covered jurisdictions, and in particular, a higher degree of
negative racial attitudes among White citizens in Section 5 areas.
Furthermore, we provide evidence of racially polarized voting that
demonstrates the landscape remains different in covered jurisdictions
than in other states. Finally, covered jurisdictions are also more likely
to employ voter disqualification policy measures than elsewhere.
Taken together, the data demonstrates a continuing danger in
preclearance locations of constitutional violations to the right to vote
on the basis of race.
1. Racial Attitudes
Among the most enduring components of institutionalized
exclusion is the enshrinement of negative racial attitudes toward non109
White groups. Whites’ resentment of non-White groups served as
the foundation for the structures of political exclusion. Indeed, social
science research has documented and continues to provide systematic
evidence for the attitudinal legacies of slavery in political attitudes
110
among Whites.
Data from the American National Election Study (ANES) of 2000
and 2008 demonstrate the differences—both substantively and
statistically significant—between White respondents to the surveys in
111
covered and non-covered jurisdictions. Table 1 shows that Whites
109. Brief of Political Science and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 6, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) [hereinafter Brief
of Political Scientists] (“Racial animosity [was] embedded in the very ideology of segregation—
deeming some groups unworthy of the benefits of citizens.”).
110. EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 148–52
(2003); KEY, JR., supra note 93, at 4–6; Avidit Acharya et al., The Political Legacy of American
Slavery 30–31 (Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/slavery.pdf.
111. American
National
Election
Studies,
2000
and
2008,
available
at
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/download/datacenter_all_datasets.php. The data
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living in Section 5 covered states are much more likely to hold
attitudes consistent with racial antipathy against minorities. For
example, 51% of the Whites residing in Section 5 states agreed that
the government should not make any effort to help Blacks, compared
with only 39% of Whites in non-covered states. Other measures of
racial attitudes shown in Table 1 document the differences in
antipathy toward groups either fully identified as minority or whose
racial grouping is signaled by stereotypes (i.e., undocumented
immigrants as Latino or Hispanic).
Table 1. Racial Attitudes Among Whites in ANES, 2000 and 2008
2008 ANES
Statement

Sec 5

2000 ANES

“Government should not make any
special effort to help Blacks because
they should help themselves.”

51

Not
Sec 5
39

Diff

Sec 5
43

Not
Sec 5
29

12**

Diff
14**

“Other minorities overcame prejudice
and worked their way. Blacks should
do the same without any special
favors.”

48

34

14**

42

32

10**

“Generations
of
slavery
and
discrimination
have
created
conditions that make it difficult for
Blacks to work their way up” –
percent who disagree

61

47

14**

57

43

14**

“If Blacks would only try harder they
could be just as well off as Whites.”

66

57

9*

54

45

9*

“It is not the federal government’s
business to see to it that Black people
get fair treatment in jobs.”

36

27

9*

38

32

6†

“Do you personally hope the United
States has an African American
president in your lifetime.”

48

56

-8*

—

—

—

“Oppose the U.S. government
making it possible for undocumented
immigrants to become U.S. citizens.”

45

33

12**

—

—

—

Chi-square test results are statistically significant: ** P>.010 * P>.050, † P>.100.
Source: American National Election Study, 2000 and 2008, data among White
respondents.

presented infra in Table 1 was compiled and organized separately by the authors.
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Political Science surveys such as the ANES also ask respondents
questions about whether and which groups have too much influence
in American politics. Table 2 presents the differences between covered
and non-covered states on these measures. White respondents in
Section 5 covered states compared with non-covered states were more
likely to say that Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Jews had too much
influence in American politics today, but were less likely to think
Whites had too much influence.
Table 2. Perceptions of Group Influence Among Whites in ANES,
2000
Statement (percent who agree)

Sec 5

2000 ANES
Not Sec 5

Diff

“Blacks have too much influence in American politics”
“Latinos have too much influence in American politics”

37
15

21
8

16**
7*

“Asians have too much influence in American politics”

10

5

5†

“Jews have too much influence in American politics”

22

14

8*

“Whites have too much influence in American politics”

16

23

-7*

Chi-square test results are statistically significant: ** P>.010 * P>.050 † P>.100.
Source: American National Election Study, 2000 data among White respondents.

Similarly, data from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES) based on interviews with more than 50,000
respondents across the fifty states show systematic variation in racial
resentment and anti-immigrant attitudes among White respondents
112
living in covered states compared with non-covered states. The
differences are detailed in Table 3.
Table 3. Racial Attitudes Among Whites in CCES, 2010
Percent Reporting
Racial Resentment
Anti-immigrant attitudes

Section 5

Non Sec 5

Diff

66%
46%

53%
35%

13%***
11%***

Chi-square test results are statistically significant: *** P>.001 ** P>.010 * P>.050.
Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2010, data among White
respondents.

112. Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2010, available at http://projects.iq.
harvard.edu/cces/data?dvn_subpage=/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/17705
(measuring racial resentment through responses to attitudinal items). The CCES is a large study
that included questions on racial resentment for the sample of respondents. The survey sample
is large enough to compare statistically significant differences across geographic locations.
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Among White respondents in covered states, an average of 66%
had high levels of racial resentment towards Blacks—a full thirteen
points higher than the measure for Whites living in non-Section 5
states. Among all of the states, White respondents in Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Georgia rated highest on their quotient of
113
racial resentment—all four states are fully covered by Section 5.
White respondents in Section 5 states were also significantly more
likely to report attitudes that were negative about immigrants and
supportive of restricting immigrant rights than White respondents in
114
non-Section 5 states and localities. Alabama, Mississippi, Texas,
Georgia, Louisiana, Alaska, and Arizona had the highest degree of
115
anti-immigrant attitudes in the CCES 2010 data. These states are all
covered by Section 5, signifying consistency with other negative racial
attitudes.
2. The Persistence of Racially Polarized Voting
These data are consistent with an abundance of published
116
research in leading academic publications. Scholarly research in the
last decade alone has produced findings showing that discriminatory
attitudes towards Blacks and Latinos persist and that they are
117
strongest among Whites in states covered by Section 5. Further,
numerous scholars conclude that harboring negative racial attitudes is
the underlying mechanism responsible for producing racial bloc
118
voting among Whites against minority candidates for elected office.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Dana Ables Morales, Racial Attitudes and Partisan Identification in the United
States, 1980–1992, 5 PARTY POL. 191, 195–97 (1999); Nicholas A. Valentino & David O. Sears,
Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South,
49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 672, 677–84 (2005).
117. See generally M. V. Hood III & Seth C. McKee, Gerrymandering on Georgia’s Mind:
The Effects of Redistricting on Vote Choice in the 2006 Midterm Election, 89 SOC. SCI. Q. 60
(2008); Jonathan Knuckey, Racial Resentment and the Changing Partisanship of Southern
Whites, 11 PARTY POL. 5 (2005); Richard Skinner & Philip A. Klinkner, Black, White, Brown
and Cajun: The Racial Dynamics of the 2003 Louisiana Gubernatorial Election, 2 FORUM 1
(2004).
118. See, e.g., EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 49–51 (1989); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL
& MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON
AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (1991); ROBERT HUCKFELDT & CAROL WEITZEL KOHFELD, RACE
AND THE DECLINE OF CLASS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 46 (1989); KEITH REEVES, VOTING
HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES & RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 74
(1997); Michael W. Giles & Kaenan Hertz, Racial Threat and Partisan Identification, 88 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 317, 319 (1994).
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In his study of racial attitudes and voting, Associate Professor Keith
Reeves finds that “a significant number of whites harbor feelings of
antipathy toward Black Americans as a categorical group—feelings
and sentiments that are openly and routinely expressed. . . . And
where such prejudices are excited . . . they constitute the critical
119
linchpin in Black office-seekers’ success in garnering White votes.”
Writing more than ten years later about the 2008 presidential
election, Michael Tesler and David Sears found the same pattern.
Even after controlling for partisanship and ideology, they found “the
most racially resentful were more than 70 percentage points more
likely to support McCain in March 2008 than were the least racially
120
resentful.” Other scholarly work also supports the finding that
discriminatory attitudes and racial prejudice play key roles in driving
White party identification, and this is especially strong in Section 5
121
covered jurisdictions.
In extending the Voting Rights Act in 2006, Congress declared
racially polarized voting to be “the clearest and strongest evidence the
Committee has before it of the continued resistence [sic] within
covered jurisdictions to fully accept minority citizens and their
122
preferred candidates into the electoral process.” Racial bloc voting
remains persistent and was evident in the voting behavior among
123
Whites during the 2008 election of Barack Obama.
These racialized attitudes, in turn, help explain the persistence and
magnitude of racially polarized voting in covered jurisdictions relative
to non-covered jurisdictions. Following the election of Barack Obama
in 2008, several political scientists took up the issue of racial prejudice
and White voting patterns for Obama, relying on respected data
124
sources and cutting-edge research methodologies. Political Scientist
Michael Lewis-Beck summarizes the data succinctly when he writes,

119. REEVES, supra note 118, at 74.
120. MICHAEL TESLER & DAVID O. SEARS, OBAMA’S RACE: THE 2008 ELECTION AND
THE DREAM OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 61 (2010).
121. See CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 118, at 49–51; Knuckey, supra note 117, at 59;
Morales, supra note 116, at 197; Valentino & Sears, supra note 116, at 674–76.
122. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 34 (2006).
123. Todd Donovan, Obama and the White Vote, 63 POL. RES. Q. 863, 870–72 (2010);
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in the 2008 U.S.
Presidential Election, 9 ANALYSIS SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 241, 248 (2009); Michael S. LewisBeck et al., Obama’s Missed Landslide: A Racial Cost?, 43 POL. SCI. POL. 69, 72–74 (2010).
124. TESLER, supra note 120, at 61; Lewis-Beck et al., supra note 123, at 75 (relying on
established datasets regularly collected by political scientists, including the American National
Election Study).
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“The roots of Obama’s relative underperformance electorally can be
laid at the feet of race prejudice. . . . Obama got the vote share he got,
instead of the landslide that could have been expected. Race appears
125
to have imposed a real cost on his electoral margin.”
Even before the Obama election, political scientists had amassed
data with a particular eye toward Section 5 covered jurisdictions, and
126
concluded that racial attitudes were driving partisanship and voting.
Jonathan Knuckey writes, “These findings suggest that race and racial
attitudes continue to shape southern party politics in the early twenty127
first century.” Racial attitudes, and in particular expressions of racial
antipathy in terms of opposition to policies aimed at enhancing
politically egalitarian outcomes, are products of practices born from
racially discriminatory political and social institutions. In Alabama,
the state at issue in Shelby County, the adoption of discriminatory
policies in the state’s 1901 Constitution (adopted by an all-White
convention) was heavily informed by the desire to keep African
American voters out of politics and in subservient positions in
128
society. Subsequent developments maintained systems of exclusion
129
and supported discriminatory practices.
To illustrate the effect of polarization in covered jurisdictions,
Table 4 summarizes the level of support for Democratic candidates
among White voters in covered and non-covered states for
130
presidential elections in 2000, 2004, and 2008. The data illustrates
that the level of White support for the Democratic nominee varies
significantly between covered and non-covered states, and the
difference is statistically significant for all years. The 2000 election
shows that the average level of White voter support for the nominee
was fourteen percentage points higher in non-covered states than in
covered states. In 2004, the average level of White support in covered

125. Lewis-Beck et al., supra note 123, at 75.
126. See, e.g., Valentino & Sears, supra note 116, at 674.
127. Knuckey, supra note 117, at 5.
128. See John B. Knox, Inaugural Address (May 22, 1901), available at
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/1901/proceedings/1901_proceedings_
vol1/day2.html (remarking that the Convention’s aim was “to establish white supremacy”); see
also ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 102; id. art. VIII, § 181(1); id. art. XIV, § 256.
129. See, e.g., KEY, JR., supra note 93, at 37–46.
130. See Brief of Political Scientists, supra note 109, at 22–26. A complete test of racially
polarized voting would search for a sharp contrast in the level of support for a candidate among
Whites compared to other racial groups. Amici curiae examine the preferences of White voters
alone as an indicator, because well over a majority of the relevant non-White groups supported
the Democratic ticket in each of the presidential elections at issue.
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states was 25%, compared with 43% in non-covered states (a
difference of 18.2 percentage points). In 2008, the level of White
support in Section 5 states was 23% compared to an average of 48%
in the rest of the country.
Table 4. Polarized Voting Among Whites in the 2000, 2004, and
2008 Presidential Elections
State

%

%

%

Gore

Kerry

Obama

‘00

‘04

‘08

04-08

00-08

%

%

%

Change

Change

Dem

Ind

Rep

Sec. 5 states

29

25

23

-2

-6

32

13

55

Non-Sec. 5

43

43

48

5

5

39

12

49

Difference

-14**

-18***

-25***

-7*

-11*

-7

1

6

Chi-square test results are statistically significant: *** P>.001 ** P>.010 * P>.050.
Sources: National Exit Poll vote among White respondents 2000, 2004, 2008; and
CCES 2010 for party identification among White voters.

Among Whites, support for the Democratic candidate declined in
the 2008 election, the year the nominee was Black. On average, White
support in preclearance states dropped an additional two percentage
points below that of the Democratic nominee in 2004. The extent of
this drop-off provides another way to assess the extent to which White
voters remain unwilling to vote for candidates due to race. In fact,
more than half of the nine total states where the measure dropped for
the Democratic nominee between 2004 and 2008 were covered
131
jurisdictions. The State of Louisiana had the nation’s steepest
decline in support among Whites, dropping ten percentage points
132
during this period—from 24% to 14%.
These results are not simply the product of partisanship. Where
nearly a third (32%) of Whites in Section 5 states identified as
Democrats, less than a quarter (23%) supported the Democratic
Party nominee for President in 2008, the lowest share of the three
elections examined here. Moreover, though about the same
percentage of White voters in the states of Utah (non-covered) and
Georgia (covered) reported their affiliation with the Republican
Party, the Black candidate in 2008 lost both statewide contests, but a
much smaller share of White voters in Georgia supported the
Democratic candidate than in Utah—one of the nation’s most

131. Id. at 24.
132. Id.
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133

Republican states. Thus political party affiliation does not fully
account for the difference in states with roughly similar patterns of
allegiance to the Republican Party.
These findings comport with other existing research that has
noted the pattern of polarized voting in national elections. The newest
published research by political scientists finds evidence that, among
White voters, Barack Obama received less support in 2008 than John
Kerry did in 2004 in many Section 5 states, largely as a result of racial
134
prejudice and discriminatory attitudes. In his analysis of the White
vote for Obama in Southern states, Professor Ben Highton notes, “at
the state level, the influence of prejudice on voting was comparable to
the influence of partisanship and ideology. Racial attitudes explain
support for Obama and shifts in Democratic voting between 2004 and
135
2008.” This finding is corroborated by Spencer Piston’s searching
individual-level analysis of voter attitudes and support for Barack
Obama in Southern states, which confirm the view “that prejudice
136
hurt Obama but not previous Democrats.”
Beyond the realm of voting, the research is quite clear that
Section 5 states continue to witness discrimination against minorities
in housing, education, employment, criminal justice, and the legal
137
system. Not only does the evidence on racially polarized voting
133. Id. at 24–25. According to the available data, about 30% of White voters in Utah
identified as Democrats, and Barack Obama received about 31% of ballots cast by Whites. By
comparison, Democrats are about 27% of all White voters, yet the Democratic ticket received
only 23% of the White vote in 2008.
134. See Donavan, supra note 123, at 867; Lewis-Beck et al., supra note 123, at 73; Tom
Pyszczynski et al., Is Obama the Anti-Christ? Racial Priming, Extreme Criticisms of Barack
Obama, and Attitudes Towards the 2008 US Presidential Candidates, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 863, 866 (2010).
135. Benjamin Highton, Prejudice Rivals Partisanship and Ideology When Explaining the
2008 Presidential Vote Across the States, 44 POL. SCI. & POL. 530, 530 (2011).
136. Spencer Piston, How Explicit Racial Prejudice Hurt Obama in the 2008 Election, 32
POL. BEHAV. 431, 447 (2010).
137. See Pauline K. Brennan & Cassia Spohn, Race/Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes
Among Drug Offenders in North Carolina, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 371, 372–73 (2008);
Fidel Ezeala-Harrison et al., Housing Loan Patterns Toward Minority Borrowers in Mississippi:
Analysis of Some Micro Data Evidence of Redlining, 35 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 43, 46 (2008);
James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., Racial Apartheid in a Small North Carolina Town, 31 REV. BLACK
POL. ECON. 89, 90–91 (2004); Bill Quigley, Racial Discrimination and the Legal System: The
Recent Lessons of Louisiana, 44 UN MONTHLY CHRON. 3, 3 (2007); John B. Strait et al.,
Rubbing Elbows in the Big Easy: The Dynamics of Residential Segregation Among Racial and
Ethnic Groups in New Orleans, Louisiana, 1990-2000, 47 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 254,
282 (2007); Jeannie Haubert Weil, Finding Housing: Discrimination and Exploitation of Latinos
in the Post-Katrina Rental Market, 22 ORG. & ENV’T 491, 498–500 (2009). See also Vanessa
Wong, Twenty States with the Most Workplace Discrimination, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Jul. 29, 2011), http://images.businessweek.com/slideshows/20110728/twenty-states-with-the-
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point to a continued need for Section 5 preclearance in selected areas,
138
but the data on racial attitudes clearly identify the symptom for
which the Department of Justice review is the remedy.
Knuckey concludes that “the increase in the effect of racial
resentment should give pause to those who would diminish the role
that racial conservatism played as an explanation for Republican
139
gains among southern Whites in the 1990s.” And in a lengthy and
thorough review of racial attitudes and voting, Political Scientist Todd
Donovan finds, “[a]lthough there are prominent examples of African
American candidates winning in electorates that are majority White,
such cases have been relatively rare. The history of race and voting in
the South demonstrates particularly high levels of racially polarized
140
voting.” Without question, the data show that Whites in Section 5
jurisdictions have higher rates of negative racial attitudes and
141
prejudice than in non-Section 5 states.
3. Voting Qualification Rules
The legacy of racial attitudes and institutionalized discrimination
are manifest in the distinct pattern of legal devices now present in
Section 5 states. Covered and partially covered jurisdictions are more
likely than others to impose an array of restrictions on the exercise of
the franchise. These restrictions, in turn, have a disparate impact on
minority access to the polls. The data in Table 5 show that the
differences between the states inside and outside the preclearance
coverage regime are stark. States fully covered by Section 5 are more
than twice as likely as non-covered states to adopt policies that make
most-workplace-discrimination#slide1 (examining United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [EEOC] merits resolutions—resolutions in favor of complainants—in
discrimination charges for fiscal year 2010 and finding six of the nine fully covered jurisdictions
among the top twenty most discriminatory states). Population size does not fully explain the
inclusion of these fully covered jurisdictions. For instance, though Texas has a population that is
more than ten million less than California, it had the most merit resolutions of any state. Id.
And whereas Alabama is only the twenty-third largest state, it ranked number eleven in EEOC
merit resolutions. Id.
138. Steven A. Tuch & Michael Hughes, Whites’ Racial Policy Attitudes in the Twenty-First
Century: The Continuing Significance of Racial Resentment, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 134, 143 (2011); see also TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN
STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 174–78 (2001) (addressing
evidence of racial resentment in other elections); Nicholas A. Valentino et al., Cues that Matter:
How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 77
(2002).
139. Knuckey, supra note 117, at 64.
140. Donovan, supra note 123, at 863
141. See supra Part II.B.1; see also supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text.
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voting more difficult for citizens, and are also more likely to employ a
combination of these restrictive measures, which amplifies the
disqualification effect on voters.
Table 5. States with Limits on Enfranchisement by Section 5
Coverage
States Fully
Covered by
Sec 5

States Fully or
Partially
Covered by
Sec 5

States Not
Covered by
Sec 5

Percent of states that currently require
1
identification to vote

25%

30%

11%

Percent that require or request photo ID
2
to vote, current and pending clearance

50%

50%

16%

Percent requiring proof of citizenship to
3
vote

25%

13%

8%

Percent that currently have permanent or
partial limits on voting if felony
4
conviction

38%

31%

16%

States with most restrictive immigration5
control legislation as current law

50%

29%

6%

8

16

34

Number of states
1

National Conference of State Legislators, Oct. 2012.

2

National Conference of State Legislators, Oct. 2012 and Ballotpedia.com, Jan. 2013.

3

Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, June 2011.

4

ACLU Map of State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws (n.d.).

5

National Conference of State Legislatures, Aug. 2012.

As Table 5 documents, states fully covered by Section 5 or that
include covered jurisdictions are much more likely to institute policies
that require citizens to produce potentially burdensome
documentation proving their identities or citizenship before they are
142
allowed to vote. The disproportionate impact that restrictive voter
identification requirements have on Black and Latino voters is wellestablished in both the scholarly literature and more general

142. States covered by Section 5 are also more likely to adopt laws that permanently or
partially limit the rights of convicted felons to vote. States that are not covered by Section 5 are
much more likely to allow convicted felons to vote as soon as their sentences are completed.
Because Blacks and Latinos are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, felon
disenfranchisement laws disproportionately deprive minority citizens of the right to vote. See
Mark Hugo Lopez & Gretchen Livingston, Hispanics and the Criminal Justice System: Low
Confidence, High Exposure, PEW HISPANIC CTR. (April 7, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
files/reports/106.pdf (“Overall . . . some 4% of adult Hispanics in 2007 were either in prison or
jail or on probation or parole. This is larger than the share of whites (2%) who were under some
form of corrections control in 2007 and smaller than the share of blacks (9%).”)
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analysis.
The presence of discrimination in covered locations compared
with non-covered locations represents the continuing legacy of the
institutionalization of racially discriminatory practices. Covered
locations identified by Section 4 were the most persistent purveyors
of government policies designed to disenfranchise minority voters
prior to the Voting Rights Act. Described as such by the majority
opinion of the Court in NAMUDNO, these “exceptional conditions
144
justified extraordinary legislation.” Petitioner’s brief in Shelby
County also acknowledged the long history of blatantly
discriminatory practices that compelled Congress to provide federal
authority in Section 5 for voting rights enforcement: “In 1965, 95 years
after the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification, African-Americans
145
were still widely denied the right to vote throughout the South.”
Despite the Court’s recognition that the coverage formula links the
genesis of unlawful election practices based in racial antipathy against
minorities to preclearance status, the Shelby County Court failed to
acknowledge the substantial empirical evidence of systematic racial
disparity that continues to this day in locations originally targeted by
146
the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
III. THREE WAYS FORWARD FOR VOTING RIGHTS
The prior two Parts addressed the foundation for the Court’s
decision to invalidate the formula undergirding the preclearance
provision and offered an empirically based critique showing the
fundamental flaws in the analysis offered by the Shelby County
majority. Notwithstanding the problems with the decision, Congress is
faced with a choice about how to approach the issue of voting rights
and entrenching the guarantees contained in the Fifteenth
143. See, e.g., Matt A. Barreto et al., Voter ID Requirements and the Disenfranchisements
of Latino, Black and Asian Voters (Sept. 1, 2007), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/
mbarreto/research/Voter_ID_APSA.pdf; Gabriel R. Sanchez et al., Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Access to Photo-ID in Texas, LATINO DECISIONS BLOG (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2012/03/21/racial-and-ethnic-differences-in-access-to-photo
-id-in-texas/.
144. NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 334 (1966)).
145. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 88, at 1–2.
146. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he Court
concludes that ‘current needs’—the modern existence of intentional racial discrimination in
voting—do, in fact, justify Congress's 2006 reauthorization of the preclearance requirement
imposed on covered jurisdictions by Section 5, as well as the preservation of the traditional
coverage formula embodied in Section 4(b).”).
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Amendment. In similar fashion, the larger civil rights bar must
envision either a world in which it works within the constraints set by
the Court or one in which it presses legislators to amend the Voting
Rights Act. In light of what we see as the Roberts majority’s emergent
philosophy on the democratic engagement of racial minorities, this
Part addresses three possible options and offers comments in favor of
a preferred strategy.
We argue that Congress may take one of at least three responses
to the Court’s decision in Shelby County: (1) effectively de-racialize
the issue of voting rights; (2) rely more heavily on existing litigation
remedies; or (3) restate and reinforce the preclearance provision with
current data. Although the third option presents risks, both legal and
political, it is the approach most consistent with the nation’s
longstanding commitment to reform the racially discriminatory
political culture in the covered jurisdictions.
A. De-Racializing Election Reform
The first option that Congress might take in light of Shelby
County is a wholesale retreat from the question of race-conscious
remedies on the subject of voting rights. This approach urges a
strategic shift away from remedies that rely on the connection
147
between racial discrimination and political structures. If one views
the Court’s decision as decidedly hostile to the proposition that race
still informs some of the barriers to full and fair political participation,
then one might support a reform that turns away from the traditional
approach to civil rights enforcement.
This move might have more bi-partisan appeal because it would
remove the stigma of racial animus that has been especially irksome
148
for Republican officials in Southern states. Further, the measure
149
would likely reach into more locations nationwide, which would
respond to Chief Justice Roberts’s purported unease with the
selectivity of the current regime. In addition, the move would answer

147. See Richard Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Antidiscrimination to the
Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 755–62 (2006); see also Jonathan Soros & Mark Schmitt, The
Missing Right: A Constitutional Right to Vote, DEMOCRACY J. IDEAS (Spring 2013), http://www.
democracyjournal.org/28/the-missing-right-a-constitutional-right-to-vote.php?page=all.
148. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 110, at 99–102.
149. This is particularly true where a nationwide right to vote would alleviate special
targeting to certain states and local jurisdictions. Several actors in the 2006 process suggested
making the preclearance system apply nationally, a proposal that was viewed as a “poison pill”
to the renewal process.
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growing concerns from the residents of jurisdictions where emergent
communities of color face voting problems that are not currently
150
receiving special attention. The crucial challenge of this strategy
would be to locate congressional authority in a constitutional
151
provision other than the Fifteenth Amendment. Three examples
help illustrate how the de-racialization strategy might translate into
policy.
1. A Real Right to Vote
Perhaps the most well-known proposal that fits this model of
reform is the proposed constitutional amendment to guarantee the
right to vote. Although the Supreme Court has essentially read the
franchise into the Fourteenth Amendment as a fundamental right—
characterizing the “right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s
152
choice” as the “essence of a democratic society” —backers of the
amendment contend that an affirmative commitment to the right
would provide the opportunity to recognize a more robust set of
153
protections for citizens and obligations for states. The right could
include not only the casting of a ballot but also the fair and effective
counting of the ballot.
Further, the right could impose specific limits on what a state may
do to restrict the right to vote, thereby directly challenging existing
doctrine that is inconsistent with a commitment to the fundamental
right to vote. Some advocates would go so far as to imply that the
provision could demand a legal bar on partisan gerrymandering, an

150. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630 (2013) (noting that “[i]f Congress had
started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present coverage formula”
because “[i]t would have been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a
fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today's statistics tell an entirely different
story . . . . [b]ut that is exactly what Congress has done”); NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)
(“The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled
out for preclearance. The statute's coverage formula is based on [outdated] data . . . , and there
is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.”).
151. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“The Fifteenth Amendment commands that the right
to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race or color, and it gives Congress the
power to enforce that command. The Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its
purpose is to ensure a better future.” (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
152. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (noting that “any restrictions on [the right
to vote] strike at the heart of representative government”).
153. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Epilogue: Bush v. Gore and the Constitutional
Right to Vote 11 (New York Univ. Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 381, 2013);
see also John B. Anderson et al., Presidential Elections—The Right to Vote and Access to the
Ballot, 29 NOVA L. REV. 571, 615–16 (2005).
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issue on which the Supreme Court currently has no settled position.
In all cases, the proponents of this plan would argue that many
ongoing concerns could be addressed by incorporating language in a
constitutional provision that might empower Congress to adopt
155
legislation to regulate states.
2. Elections Clause
A second proposal takes a less ambitious approach than the
constitutional amendment, and focuses instead on existing but
seldom-used provisions in the founding charter. For example, the
Supreme Court itself has recently turned its attention to the Elections
Clause of Article I, which empowers Congress to set rules that
156
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections. The federal
154. See Vieth v. Jubilirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309–10 (2004); Lois Beckett, Is Partisan
Gerrymandering Unconstitutional?, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.
propublica.org/article/is-partisan-gerrymandering-unconstitutional; Kali Borkoski, An Interview
with Justice Stevens, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 3, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2011/11/an-interview-with-justice-stevens/ (stating that Justice Stevens contends that partisan
gerrymandering is “outrageously unconstitutional”). Some states have taken such measures
already, such as Florida. Florida’s Constitution was amended in 2010 to prohibit lawmakers
from establishing apportionment plans “with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or
an incumbent.” See FLA CONST. art. III, §§ 20–21.
155. John Nichols, Time for a ‘Right to Vote’ Constitutional Amendment, THE NATION
(Mar.
5,
2013),
http://www.thenation.com/article/173200/time-right-vote-constitutionalamendment# (justifying the need for a constitutional amendment because “[v]oting rights have
too frequently been left to chance in the United States,” and noting that “[e]ven as the franchise
has been extended through constitutional and other federal initiatives, the administration of
elections has been left to states with radically different standards”); Norm Ornstein, The U.S.
Needs a Constitutional Right to Vote, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2013/10/the-us-needs-a-constitutional-right-to-vote/281033/
(“[T]he
Constitution contains no explicit right to vote. . . . An explicit constitutional right to vote would
give traction to individual Americans who are facing [voter-suppression] tactics, and to legal
cases challenging restrictive laws.”); Jonathan Soros & Mark Schmitt, The Missing Right: A
Constitutional Right to Vote, DEMOCRACY J. IDEAS (Spring 2013), http://www.democracy
journal.org/28/the-missing-right-a-constitutional-right-to-vote.php?page=all (“[T]he right to
vote is itself a subject of continued partisan, regional, and racial conflict. It’s time to resolve the
fights, and fulfill the promise of American democracy, by joining together in an effort to make
the right to vote, at last, a part of our basic covenant as a nation.”). Representative Mark Pocan
(D-WI) proposed to amend the Constitution by adding the following: “Section 1. Every citizen
of the United States, who is of legal voting age, shall have the fundamental right to vote in any
public election held in the jurisdiction in which the citizen resides. Section 2. Congress shall
have the power to enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation.” H.R.J. Res. 44,
113th Cong. (2013).
.
156 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1–2; Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (“Of course, the Federal
Government retains significant control over federal elections. For instance, the Constitution
authorizes Congress to establish the time and manner for electing Senators and
Representatives.”); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257–58
(2013) (“The Constitution prescribes a straightforward rule for the composition of the federal
electorate. . . . [E]lectors in each State for the House of Representatives ‘shall have the
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supervisory power in this area has long been recognized as an under157
utilized source of authority. In Colegrove v. Green,
Justice
Frankfurter concluded that an early one-person-one-vote claim was
nonjusticiable because the Elections Clause committed the regulation
158
of district line drawing (at least at the federal level) to Congress.
Invoking the same constitutional provision, Congress could command
the states to abide by certain rules in elections involving campaigns
for federal offices (which would include both presidential and midterm elections).
To the extent that the Court is willing to endorse a robust
interpretation of the Elections Clause, this approach is perhaps the
most readily available national answer to the problem—at least as far
as federal elections are concerned. Although it is not clear how
broadly the federal power applies, particularly against a contrary and
159
important state objective, the provision does provide an alternative
and relatively straightforward source of power for legislation that
guarantees access to the political system. Of course, the power would
presumably not reach those elections for state and local government
160
that occur in odd years without a federal election on the ballot.
3. Good Government Rules
Other proposals favor the adoption of neutral procedural rules to
help curtail decisions about the electoral system that might not reflect
the best interests of a community. For instance, the public notice and
comment concept is a simple but possibly effective means to assure
careful consideration of new election laws. Absent the preclearance
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature,’ and
the Seventeenth Amendment adopts the same criterion for senatorial elections.” (citation
omitted)).
157. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
158. Id. at 556.
159. See Arizona, 133 S. Ct. at 2256–59 (outlining the proposed balance of power between
state and federal enforcement regimes to regulate voter identification laws where the state has a
policy that appears to conflict with that of a federal agency).
160. Two examples of states that frequently hold their statewide races in the absence of
federal campaigns are New Jersey and Virginia. Karl Kurtz, Why do Four States Have Odd-Year
Elections, THE THICKEST AT STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2011), http://ncsl.typepad.com/
the_thicket/2011/08/why-do-four-states-have-odd-year-elections.html. Aside from these states, a
multitude of county and local governments also hold elections that occur outside of the federal
campaign window. See Jose P. Hernandez, Odd-Year vs. Even-Year Consolidated Elections in
GREENLINING
INST.
(OCT.
2013),
http://greenlining.org/wpCalifornia,
THE
content/uploads/2013/10/Research-Brief-Odd-Year-vs-Even-Year-Consolidated-Elections-inCalifornia.pdf (detailing the heightened costs associated with off-year elections at the local
level).
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process, a rule that imposes a general waiting period on any new
legislation focused on voting would further several principles that are
commonly associated with good governance.
As an example, Professor Gilda Daniels has suggested a waiting
period to ensure that the enacting jurisdiction has carefully
161
considered the implications of the bill. It would also provide notice
to the public of a pending change, which would prompt their attention
to and involvement in developing new measures. And, where the
proposed regulation raises problems, the procedural measure might
offer potential plaintiffs time to negotiate change before the new
measure is enacted. It would also offer more time to a plaintiff class to
develop the terms of a lawsuit.
* * *
There is nothing inherently objectionable about any of the
aforementioned ideas for responding to Shelby County. Indeed, one
can imagine that they could operate quite well within an overall
reform effort that takes on either of the other two broad strategies to
be discussed below. However, they each heavily depend upon judicial
endorsement of a broad federal authority to regulate elections that
seems unlikely after Shelby County. This is particularly so where the
legislative enactment might demand that jurisdictions assume burdens
on their sovereignty that seem inconsistent with the expressed
162
political preferences of their constituents. Unless advocates can
assert new arguments to the Court—or the composition of the Court
changes and new members are willing to rethink these principles—
one cannot see great promise in using these approaches to reframe
the debate.
The larger problem with relying only on these strategies as an
answer to Shelby County is that they are insufficient substitutes for
the kind of focused attention necessary in areas where the political
environment remains divided by race. Chief Justice Roberts is surely
correct that political conditions have improved over time in the areas
163
identified by Section 4. However, he is incorrect to assert that these
161. See Protecting the Right to Vote: Oversight of the Department of Justice’s Preparations
for the 2008 General Election: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 106
(2008) (statement of Gilda R. Daniels, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of
Law); see also Heather Gerken, The Missing Right to Vote, SLATE (June 13, 2012),
http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/the-missing-right-to-vote.
162. See Arizona, 133 S. Ct. at 2256–57 (outlining the proposed yet untested balance of
power between state and federal enforcement regimes to regulate voter identification laws).
163. Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628–29 (2013).

CRAYTON AND JUNN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

FIVE JUSTICES, SECTION 4, AND THREE WAYS FORWARD

4/2/2014 1:19 PM

151

areas are now virtually indistinguishable from the remainder of the
nation. By ignoring the ongoing differences within these areas, a deracialized reform effort might well miss severe manifestations of race
discrimination present in the areas on which Section 5 focused.
B. Litigation Centered Enforcement
An alternate approach would take the Court’s invitation at face
value and rely solely on litigation as a means of enforcing voting
rights. Although it does not retreat from the cause of employing racebased remedies, this approach departs from the strategy of using an
administrative remedy, such as preclearance, to select jurisdictions
based on their prior behavior. Instead, the remedial approach ties
federal action to litigation activity, which would essentially isolate
those parts of the country where plaintiffs successfully challenge
discriminatory provisions and structures.
The most commonly advocated version of this approach directs
attention to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, an entitlement for
plaintiffs to file lawsuits in district court that currently applies
nationwide and adopts a traditional adversarial posture. By returning
to lawsuit-based attacks on discriminatory provisions, litigants will be
pressed to focus on the individual circumstances of each case. It is
argued that little if anything would be lost in a reformed regime
because many of the prior restraint measures that are built into
Section 5 are also available using temporary restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions. Ultimately, Congress could develop a more
current record based on the rates of rights violations and associated
court findings from Section 2 challenges that might later merit a more
specialized administrative remedy.
Some advocates would endorse a set of enhancements to Section 2
164
that would offer greater ease with which to pursue voting litigation.
For example, one could push for a more forgiving standard for a
preliminary injunction where voting regulations are concerned, in
light of the pressing time considerations of elections. One might also
suggest that relying on Section 3 (the bail-in procedure) represents an
165
enhanced version of the traditional litigation approach. Under
164. See Bernice M. Bird, Section 2 as an “Adequate Substitute” for Section 5: Proposing
an “Effects-Only” Test as an Amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Dec.
2012) (unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/bernice_bird/3/.
165. See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and
Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1997 (2010) (“[C]ivil rights groups can redefine the
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Section 3, a jurisdiction that is found to have violated constitutional
rights might be ordered to comply with the preclearance regime
166
where a judge finds that remedy appropriate. Unlike the version of
preclearance voided in Section 5, the trigger for coverage here would
be more individualized and only follow after an evidentiary showing
that the behavior of the jurisdiction demanded a more sweeping
remedy than an order of damages.
As appealing as a singular reliance on this litigation approach
sounds in theory, it tends to ignore much of the reality that gave rise
to the preclearance system in the first place—it was the inability of
federal litigation on its own to address the problems that convinced
167
Congress to develop an oversight scheme. The problems were too
widespread and the defendants were too innovative; traditional
168
lawsuits could not keep up with such a dynamic target.
Even though it is undisputed that the situation in covered states
has improved since 1965, the time and costs associated with
litigation—both for the Department of Justice and private civil rights
169
attorneys—remain considerable. At present, the costs associated
with obtaining experts, developing strategies, and conducting a trial
would stretch present public and private resources quite thin. Further,
the increased use of litigation would mean that states themselves
would be subject to higher expenditures to respond to complaints.
Even if lawsuits were successful, the negative byproducts of increased
litigation makes this strategy rather undesirable.
The proposals for litigation enhancement would also require
Congress’s endorsement, which would presumably require votes from
members who would be disinclined to increase the chances their
states would find themselves named as defendants in race-based
challenges. Though there may be some appeal in this approach
relative to the preclearance system, it is not at all obvious that this
effort would be more popular among opponents of anti-

preclearance regime through litigation.”).
166. Id.
167. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (“Congress had found that
case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in
voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the
obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits.”).
168. Id.
169. Voting Rights Act After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Shelby County: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice, 113th Cong. 52–58 (2013) (statement
of Spencer Overton, Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School).
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170

discrimination lawsuits.
Perhaps most daunting, though, is the very real possibility that the
existing set of protections now contained in Section 2 will be struck
down. A subset of the same parties that have attacked the
constitutional basis for Section 5 have also vowed to turn their
attention to undermine the effects-based test that supports Section 2’s
171
concept of vote dilution. If successful, the effort could eliminate any
effective legal protection in the Voting Rights Act. To the extent the
Roberts majority already views affirmative action policies in contexts
172
like education with disfavor, it is quite possible that such a future
legal challenge in the voting rights sphere could succeed by framing
the litigation as a departure from the principle that unconstitutional
173
state-based discrimination has to be intentional in nature.
C. Reinforcing Existing Section 5
The third approach, the one that we endorse, is an effort to
reinforce the provision at issue in Shelby County. It takes the
majority’s statement in Shelby County on its own terms as an
invitation to show the Chief Justice what he does not see: a basis for
differential treatment—using readily available information in the
record. This approach would make explicit use of current relevant
criteria in a formula that reinforces the ongoing legislative record to
identify those communities with persistent problems of political
incorporation.
We reject the arguments favoring a wholesale retreat from the
174
transformative approach of preclearance. First, nothing in Shelby
170. See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 137–91 (1987) (describing a negative view of novel
enforcement theories in the absence of congressional action to change the statute itself).
171. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893–94 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A clear
understanding of the destructive assumptions that have developed to guide vote dilution
decisions and the role we have given the federal courts in redrawing the political landscape of
the Nation should make clear the pressing need for us to reassess our interpretation of the
Act.”); THERNSTROM, supra note 170, at 233–35 (criticizing the application of “vote dilution”
jurisprudence as a judicial misadventure).
172. See supra Part I.
173. Already, parties have put forth arguments in the context of Section 2 lawsuits
advancing a limited interpretation of the provision against challenges to voter identification
laws, suggesting that the provision is unconstitutional if applied to these statutes. See
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–25, Veasey v. Perry, No. 2:13-CV-193 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20,
2013); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (“Our decisions, moreover, have
made clear that action by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” (citation omitted)).
174. See Kareem Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REV. 201, 232
AND
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County establishes a clear statement that Congress may not devise a
regulation that addresses a problem more pronounced in some states
than in others. As Justice Ginsburg highlighted in her lively dissent,
legislative enactments commonly differentiate among the states based
175
upon the presence or absence of certain factors. And these criteria
can work in situations where states are identified to benefit as well as
176
to incur special responsibilities.
177
The majority offered no sufficient answer to this charge, which
suggests that it does not view the differential approach to regulation
as inherently troubling. Indeed, the majority seemed to focus on the
need for a rational connection between the formula and current
178
conditions on the ground. Of course, election regulation may be the
presumptive domain of state sovereignty for the Court, but nothing in
Shelby County purports to change the continued application of the
179
City of Boerne line of cases. The cases following the City of Boerne
logic make clear that because the Voting Right Act intersects two
substantive areas of heightened constitutional attention, it deserves a
180
level of deference in the fit analysis; there is little to suggest that a
current-conditions formula would fail judicial review.
Second, our approach is desirable because it utilizes an established
set of principles and metrics already familiar to local jurisdictions and
states that have been subject to Section 5. So too would the courts
have greater ease in the application of a reinforced law. One great
peril of completely scrapping the existing preclearance structure is
that any new system would leave questions about meaning and
application that would need to be resolved by the Supreme Court.

(2010) (proposing “a distinct way of defining the substantive aims of the preclearance system”).
175. See Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s unprecedented extension of the equal sovereignty principle outside its proper
domain—the admission of new States—is capable of much mischief. Federal statutes that treat
States disparately are hardly novelties. . . . Do such provisions remain safe given the Court’s
expansion of equal sovereignty’s sway?” (citations omitted)).
176. Id.
177. See id. at 2630 (majority opinion) (“The dissent treats the Act as if it were just like any
other piece of legislation, but this Court has made clear from the beginning that the Voting
Rights Act is far from ordinary.”).
178. See id. at 2631.
179. See id. (purporting to address only the mismatch between the statute’s targeting
formula and current conditions, which the Court refers to as an “initial prerequisite” for Section
5 to be constitutional).
180. See supra Part I.
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With the reinforced law, the Court would be limited (at least to
some extent) by existing precedent, which would tend to preserve the
level of substantive improvement in representation for racial
181
minorities in a given political community. Though there are, of
course, issues that remain unclear or ambiguous under the current
system, the terms of the debates are well laid out to interested parties.
Starting anew poses some risks for minority populations, whose rights
were hard won and whose continued progress in the political system
should not be taken lightly.
Finally, the approach takes account of what we find is the central
concern of the preclearance system—the transformation of states with
longstanding histories of racial exclusion. The goal is ultimately to aid
in eliminating the vestiges of racially discriminatory culture and
practices and to establish more durable and effective communities
that are open to voters regardless of their race. Achieving this longterm goal demands sustained attention to assure that hard won gains
are not quickly reversed or lost.
Notwithstanding the Roberts majority’s assertion to the
182
contrary, important effects of the pre-1965 era of exclusion remain
present and pronounced in much of the preclearance territory as
183
compared to elsewhere. To the extent that these jurisdictions remain
standouts, retreating from the task of reforming their systems
essentially endorses the maintenance of institutionalized race
discrimination, along with the backsliding Congress hoped to
184
prevent. And those who would bear the greatest burden of such an
outcome are the very populations that were deprived of their
fundamental rights for an extended portion of this nation’s history.
There are two broad approaches that Congress might take as part
of this strategy to reinforce Section 4 and Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. To illustrate we offer likely scenarios that would indicate
the geographic reach of adopting each approach. First, legislators
could use current evidence that closely tracks participation factors

181. Because the structure of Section 5 is intended to prevent jurisdictional backsliding, see
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 323 (2000), the reinforced provision would
generally serve to maintain existing levels of representation and political clout for a protected
group.
182. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (explaining how “things have changed
dramatically”).
183. See Brief of Political Scientists, supra note 109, at 39 n.115.
184. Id. at 4–5.
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very similar to those used by sponsors in 1965. Alternatively,
Congress could take a more modern approach and marshal additional
factors related to (though not directly analogous) to the factors
traditionally used to support the preclearance formula.
1. Participation Based Formula
Even Chief Justice Roberts would agree that participation is a
valid metric on which to assess the entrenchment of the right to
186
vote. The apparent problem in Shelby County is that the metrics for
turnout and registration have substantially improved since 1965,
which in the majority’s view obviated the need for a continued
187
remedy. Although racial parity seems the norm for presidential
elections (the length of time that Congress used in 1965), Professor
Bernard Fraga has provided helpful analysis showing the persistence
of clear turnout differentials during mid-term election years that tend
188
to distinguish areas that were subject to preclearance. In his
treatment of data over a series of years, Fraga finds evidence for the
proposition that Roberts embraces regarding turnout during
presidential years: Blacks tend to have equal (or at times, greater)
rates compared to Whites on turnout measures during the last two
presidential elections, and preclearance states are generally more
189
favorable on this score.
In stark contrast, however, patterns of voting turnout in midterm
elections do not show parity. As Fraga writes:
Nationwide, African-American voter turnout was approximately
15 percentage points below that of the non-Hispanic White
population in 2006, and 12 points below White turnout in 2010. In
2008 and 2012, however, Black turnout was within 5 percentage
points of White turnout. Despite recent gains, there is not
190
consistent racial parity in voter turnout.

185. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 101 at 7, 18–19.
186. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (relying on data showing an increase in AfricanAmerican voter registration).
187. Id.
188. Bernard Fraga, The SCOTUS Majority is Missing Exactly What the VRA Sought to
Remedy, THE MONKEY CAGE (June 27, 2013), http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/27/the-scotusmajority-is-missing-exactly-what-the-vra-sought-to-remedy/ (noting that whereas many
Southern states ask citizens their race when they register to vote, other states do not; thus,
estimates of race are made based on “census block demographic data and name matching”).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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States like Texas, New York, Florida, and Virginia have markedly
higher disparities between Black and White voter turnout in mid191
term election years. This trend helps to explain why one might find
the rise of the Tea Party in the 2010 midterm election, shortly after
Obama’s victory, a historic election of the nation’s first non-White
192
president. But more to the point, these disparities offer some
indication that incorporating off-year elections (involving only state
and local races or midterm years) may lead to a different assessment.
Insofar as midterm elections focus on legislators, who directly
represent the people, Congress might find that a formula
incorporating turnout during years that do not involve a presidential
election reaches more jurisdictions than before.
2. Formula Utilizing Racial Bias
A second approach to an updated formula, which would likely
incorporate much of the existing preclearance territory, could rely on
current data on the demonstrated unwillingness of White voters to
cooperate across racial lines. As mentioned in Part II of this Article,
there are ample measures in political science that assess how
frequently these negative and racialized viewpoints interact with the
193
existing political structure to impede minority political effectiveness.
On this score, the Chief Justice maintains a clear hesitation about
the relevance of this kind of data in his analysis. His negative
comments about the preclearance formula in Shelby County instead
fixate on the traditional participation factors that Congress identified
194
in 1965. However, this critique would only be sensible if one
assumes that the right to vote is limited to those steps necessary to
cast a ballot in the election—the obvious main concern when outright
vote denial was the norm. But the great weight of the case law, from
195
Katzenbach to Thornburg v. Gingles, also expresses a much broader

191. Id.
192. See CHRISTOPHER S. PARKER & MATT A. BARRETO, CHANGE THEY CAN’T BELIEVE
IN: THE TEA PARTY AND REACTIONARY POLITICS IN AMERICA 214–17 (2013) (providing
survey evidence that Tea Party members, even accounting for ideology, hold negative views
about racial minorities in general and President Obama in particular).
193. As discussed in Part II of this Article, there are ample measures applied in political
science that assess how frequently these negative and racialized viewpoints interact with the
existing political structure to impede minority political effectiveness.
194. See Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) (relying on voter registration
data).
195. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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concern with the effectiveness of the votes that are cast. The
political rules and systems that translate those ballots into electoral
success and governing authority are equally at play. The secondgeneration matters, which relate to how cast votes are aggregated and
valued, are equally relevant to assessing the full and fair exercise of
197
the right to vote.
Moreover, the Roberts majority’s fixation on the fact that
Congress in 1965 did not explicitly address factors related to
198
dilution is of no particular significance. The Southern strategy of
enacting measures to achieve outright vote denial prior to the Voting
Rights Act obviated the need for metrics to track the effectiveness of
cast ballots. For the most part in the South, there were no votes cast
199
by Blacks in any large number. Accordingly, one cannot rely upon
the mere absence of these measures in the original formula as
evidence that Congress never thought these issues were relevant. As
the maps in Figures 1–3 show, political attitudes of racial resentment,
anti-immigrant biases, and racial polarization are most prevalent in
states covered by Section 5. This pattern persists for all three
200
indicators of racial disparity.
196. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1969) (“The Voting Rights
Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations . . . . [T]he Act gives a
broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes ‘all action necessary to
make a vote effective.’” (citations omitted)).
197. The term “second generation” voting issues refers to the problem of vote dilution, i.e,
concerns having to do with the counting and value of cast ballots. See Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman, Introduction to QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, supra note 102, at 3, 14–15 (discussing the parallel generations
of voting rights research and measurement). These are related to the “first generation” matters
concerning qualification for the franchise and casting of the ballot, however, the Shelby County
Court sees these as distinct problems, not of concern to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“The dissent relies on ‘second generation barriers,’ which are
not impediments to the casting of ballots, but rather electoral arrangements that affect the
weight of minority votes. That does not cure the problem.”).
198. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (looking only to tests, devices, and low voting rate).
199. See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV.
523, 542 (1972) (noting that during and after Reconstruction, “the various disfranchising
vehicles” served to wholly eliminate Blacks from the political process, with “rare exceptions”).
200. In geographic fashion, these figures display upon the contemporary social science data
referenced above by state. Figure 2 includes a total of eleven of the “top ten” racially polarized
states due to a tie among four states. In each figure, the Section 5 states in the Deep South
consistently fall within targeted areas. Though the three factors do not capture every one of the
Section 5 jurisdictions, Section 5 jurisdictions do represent a majority of the areas where these
disparity measures are the highest. Furthermore, there is no constitutional requirement that
Congress design remedies that perfectly align with the states that were initially designated by
the triggering formula. Where the underlying theory for the remedy is that the project of
reforming originally designated states is a long term one, Congress could reasonably conclude
that the evidence endorses an approach of caution before ending federal review.
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Figure 3.

CONCLUSION: AFTER SHELBY COUNTY
Though the majority in NAMUDNO expressed uncertainty about
whether there was sufficient justification for the burden of
preclearance to outweigh the apparent unequal treatment among the
201
202
states, the Shelby County Court was unequivocal. In NAMUNDO,
judgment was rendered and the question regarding the evidence of
continuing racial disparities was settled: “The statute’s coverage
formula is now more than 35 years old, and there is considerable
203
evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.”
This comment about the age of the coverage formula belied the
position that the majority eventually would take in Shelby County:
204
The formula was both anachronistic and unnecessary. Contrary to
201. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (“[T]he fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”).
202. Compare NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (“The evil that § 5 is meant to address
may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”), with Shelby
Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (“[W]e expressed our broader concerns [in NAMUDNO] about the
constitutionality of the [Voting Rights] Act. Congress could have updated the coverage formula
at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare §
4(b) unconstitutional.”).
203. NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. at 203.
204. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“Congress did not use the record it compiled to
shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula based
on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”).
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the informed actions of Congress and the will of the American people,
the Shelby County Court seemingly found that the era of the most
pernicious racial discrimination—at the structural, institutional, and
205
individual level—had ended. In contrast, the record of systemic and
empirical evidence reviewed here reveals that continuing racial
disparities in once-covered jurisdictions remain visible to the naked
eye. Our ignominious past of slavery and the perpetuation of racial
antipathy over the vast majority of the nation’s history remain
codified in the political DNA of preclearance locations. Once
blatantly enshrined in constitutions and state and local election laws,
these social ills now are revealed through systematically higher levels
of racial antipathy, racially-polarized voting, and barriers to voting
that disproportionately affect minority voters in these locations. This
considerable evidence, which persuaded vast majorities in Congress
and a United States President, was nevertheless ignored and denied
by Shelby County’s five-member majority.
Institutionalized political exclusion based on race had profound
effects not just on eliminating Black voting and registration, but also
on election outcomes and public policy. It allowed governors like
George Wallace to grandstand in support of maintaining all-White
206
public universities. It was also the reason that Senators like Strom
Thurmond and Richard Russell were able to block and dilute
proposed national civil rights legislation during the first half of the
207
twentieth century. A politics of, by, and for the concerns and
interests of one racial group to the exclusion of all others is indeed
the essence of racial entitlement. And the system designed to exclude
Black political voices in the South was built to last.
It would take the lives of many women and men in the civil rights
movement and the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act for the
nation to dedicate itself anew in the twentieth century to dismantling
state-sponsored voting discrimination. The law’s constitutionality has
been affirmed multiple times by the Supreme Court. In Katzenbach,

205. See id. at 2631 (“Our country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in
voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem
speaks to current conditions.”).
206. See George C. Wallace, Governor of the State of Alabama, Inaugural Address 2 (Jan.
14, 1963) (transcript available at http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/utils/getfile/collection/
voices/id/2952/filename/2953.pdf).
207. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE
921 (2009) (describing the key role of Senators Russell and Thurmond in the effort to scuttle
earlier civil rights provisions in 1957).
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in which only one Justice partially dissented, the Court acknowledged
the judiciary’s role in countenancing the entrenchment of race
208
discrimination in politics. As recently as 2009, the majority opinion
of the Roberts Court in NAMUDNO noted that, despite its
misgivings about the statute, these systematic and state-sanctioned
violations of rights were “exceptional conditions . . . [that] justified
209
extraordinary legislation.”
As the petitioner in Shelby County observed, nearly a century
would pass between the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and
210
the implementation of the Voting Rights Act. Although the “halflife” of the virulent racial antipathy that fueled discriminatory voting
procedures in preclearance states is unknown, experience admonishes
us all to take great care in eliminating effective safeguards until it is
unequivocally demonstrable that covered jurisdictions are no
different from non-covered locations.

208. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325–26 (1966).
209. NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009) (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
210. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 88, at 2.

